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Client relationships create value, which employees may try to wrest from their employers by setting
up their own firms. If when an employer and worker establish a relationship they cannot contract on
the output and profits of the worker’s prospective new firm, the employer counters by inducing the
worker to sign a contract that prohibits him from competing or soliciting the current client in the event
of termination of employment. The socially optimal level of entrepreneurship will nevertheless be
achieved if clients, employers, and workers can renegotiate these restrictive employment contracts
and make compensating transfers. If workers cannot finance transfers to employers, however, employers
and workers will sign contracts that are too restrictive and produce too little entrepreneurship, and
governments can increase welfare by limiting enforcement of these contracts. With or without liquidity
constraints, locations where non-compete contracts are less enforced will attract more clients and have
higher employment and output.
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1Development of data sets that would allow us to track client-based entrepreneurship is still in its
infancy.  Phillips (2002, p. 500) regrets that “data on law firm clientele are sporadically and
unreliably available.  An ideal study of the parent-progeny transfer using law firms would follow
the movement of the clients from the parents to the progeny.”
1.   Introduction
Initially motivated by famous examples in the high-tech sector, the study of employee
spinoffs has now broadened as their importance for entrepreneurship across all economic sectors
has become recognized.  Hvide (2006) studies employee entrepreneurs among Stanford MBAs
concentrated in professional services, and Cabral and Wang (2008) analyze the determinants of
the performance of employee spinoff firms in the automobile industry.  Klepper and Sleeper
(2005) and Franco and Filson (2006) argue that even in high-tech industries (lasers and disk
drives, respectively), employees may simply exploit knowledge they learned during their
employment rather than their own technological innovations to become competitors with their
former employers. 
Part of the knowledge that entrepreneurs acquire when employed, especially in services,
is knowledge of potential clients for their future businesses.  Rauch and Watson (2002, Table 1)
find that, when international trade intermediaries handling differentiated products started their
firms, clients outside of the United States with whom they had experience from previous
employment accounted for over half of their international business.  Ruef (2002) reports that 52
percent of the MBA entrepreneurs he surveyed used discussions with customers or suppliers to
develop their business ideas.  Muendler and Rauch (2010) find that exporting spinoffs from
exporting parents sell mainly to the same destinations as the parents at the time of spinoff, and
continue to sell to those destinations even when the parents’ export destinations change.
12
2Marx et al. find that an inadvertent change in Michigan state law from non-enforcement to
enforcement of non-competes reduced the mobility of inventors as traced through their patent
addresses.
“Theft” of clients from employers by employees is a sufficiently common issue that the
former often include non-solicitation covenants in the employment contracts of the latter.  These
covenants are one of a number of restrictive clauses that an employer can include in an
employee’s contract in an attempt to restrict him from competing against the employer in the
event of separation.  The enforcement of such “non-competes” is controversial and varies widely
from state to state within the United States and has even changed within states over time
(Garmaise 2009, Marx et al. 2009).
2  In deciding whether non-compete covenants are
enforceable, Carnevale and Doran (2001) write that “courts generally consider whether the
covenant protects ‘trade secrets’ to which an employee may have had access or whether the
employee’s services are ‘unique or extraordinary’....With regard to customer relationships courts
have found that employers have a legitimate interest in protecting the ‘unique’ relationship that
an employee develops with the employer’s clients or an interest in protecting ‘customer
relations’.”
Client-based entrepreneurship can thus be seen as part of a struggle between employers
and employees over the value created by client relationships.  Our objectives in this paper are to
explore theoretically the efficiency consequences of this struggle and identify the relationship
between the form of employment contracts, legal rules governing restrictive covenants, and the
incidence of client-based entrepreneurship.  We also extend our analysis to the impact on the
allocation of clients across jurisdictions of differences in legal rules and in local government
facilitation of startups.3
3In the legal services industry, a strong bias towards the rights of clients to choose who will
represent them is reflected by the fact that, in general, courts will not enforce restrictive
covenants on lawyers (Hillman 1990 §2.3.2 and §2.3.3).
In section 2 we model the relationship between one employer (“firm”), one employee
(“worker”), and one client.  Key assumptions are that the firm and worker sign a contract before
meeting the client, and that the output and profits of the worker’s prospective new firm are not
verifiable.  The latter assumption leads to a need for monetary transfers between the parties when
negotiating a possible separation of the worker and client from the firm (client-based
entrepreneurship), and also to an unwillingness of banks to lend to the worker to make a transfer
to the firm (to buy out his contract) if the worker does not have the cash on hand.  One might
think that the “deep pockets” of the client would avoid inefficiently low separation because of
the worker’s liquidity constraint.  However, we show in section 3 that the prospect of extracting
wealth from the client actually induces the firm and worker to sign a more restrictive non-
compete contract, and that the client insists on participation of the worker in buying out the
latter’s contract.  Only a government decision not to enforce these contracts, therefore, averts
inefficiently low separation.  Our model thus suggests that welfare rises when courts emphasize
the rights of clients to choose whom they will employ over the rights of employers to restrict
competition from their former workers.
3  We also show that as the government weakens
enforcement, the firm must pay the worker more to retain her (and her client) when the three
parties find it efficient to remain together.
In section 4 we extend our model to allow for many locations, each of which is endowed
with many firms.  Each firm in turn can employ many workers, each serving one client.  We
show that differences across locations in willingness to enforce non-competes become an4
4The overall service share of U.S. value added, which includes NAICS 51-81, increased from
42.0% in 1987 to 51.2% in 2008.  The U.S. Department of Commerce defines “Professional and
business services” as NAICS 54-56, which includes “Professional, scientific, and technical
element of regional competitive advantage, leading to differences in numbers of clients and rates
of entrepreneurship across locations.  Gilson (1999) has argued that covenants not to compete
are much less enforceable in California than in Massachusetts.  Examining potential causes of
the success of Silicon Valley in California relative to Route 128 in Massachusetts, McMillan
(2002, p. 114) claims, citing the work of Gilson,  “The post employment covenant lies at the root
of the differences between Silicon Valley and Route 128.”  McMillan is concerned with the
ability of restrictive covenants to prevent departing employees from taking with them
technological innovations rather than client relationships, but we conjecture that far more
entrepreneurs start their businesses on the basis of the latter than the former.
In section 5 we compare our model and results to those in the literature on employee
spinoffs and non-competes, and discuss the robustness of our results to changes in assumptions
about the economic environment in which clients, firms, and workers operate.  Section 6
concludes.
2.   A Model of Client-Firm-Worker Interaction
We develop a model that most naturally fits providers of professional and business
services and their clients.  We focus on these services for two reasons.  First, they are growing
even more rapidly than overall services as a share of total output.  Professional and business
services increased from 8.7% of U.S. value added in 1987 to 12.7% of U.S. value added in 2008,
raising their share of overall services from 20.8% to 24.7%.
4  Second, the clients of professional5
services” (NAICS 54), “Management of companies and enterprises” (NAICS 55), and
“Administrative and waste management services” (NAICS 56).  All figures are from U.S.
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Industry Economic Accounts,
http://www.bea.gov/industry/gdpbyind_data.htm.
5When explaining their results, Klier and Testa supply a quotation from Lichtenberg (1960) that
underscores why relationships with outside professional and business service providers are so
important for corporate clients:  “Like producers of unstandardized products, the central office
executives ‘produce’ answers to unstandardized problems, problems that change frequently,
radically, and unpredictably....  These problems are solved quickly only by consultation with a
succession of experts.  But ... most central offices would find it inefficient if not impossible to
staff themselves internally with all of the specialized personnel and services that they must call
on from time to time to solve their problems....  All of these considerations dictate a
concentration of central offices ... near their ‘suppliers’.”
6Our model is static.  We leave evolution of the numbers of firms and their reputations to future
research.
and business service providers are mainly businesses themselves, making professional and
business service quality a key to the ability of locations to attract and retain business in general. 
For example, corporate headquarters locate where there is easy access to high quality
accounting, advertising, consulting, financial, legal, and other related services.  Klier and Testa
(2002) find that the growth of large company headquarters between 1990 and 2000 across U.S.
metropolitan areas is significantly associated only with the growth of metro area population and
the 1990 share of metro area nonfarm earnings in professional and business services.
5
We assume that each location is endowed with a mass of professional and business
service providers (“firms”) that have established reputations by successfully serving clients in
the past.
6  New clients only approach firms with reputations, so professionals who have
completed their schooling must affiliate with firms in order to get work, thereby becoming
“workers.”  In any location the mass of firms is small relative to the mass of potential workers,
so the former have all the bargaining power in initial contracting.  In this section we model the6
7We calculate the model’s contractual equilibrium.  See Watson (2004) for notes on the relation
between cooperative and noncooperative approaches to modeling negotiation in a dynamic
strategic setting.
8The assumed disagreement point represents the idea that exogenous events would, with some
probability, cause the separation of the worker and firm if they fail to reach an agreement in a
interaction between one firm, one worker, and one client in a given location.  We assume that a
worker can only serve one client at a time.  A firm can hire multiple workers, but negotiates
separately with each worker and worker-client pair as described below.  In section 4, we expand
the analysis to consider multiple locations, each with many firms and workers serving clients.
Our model of client-firm-worker interaction focuses on times when the parties negotiate
over contractual terms.  We analyze the negotiation using standard cooperative bargaining
theory, which has the usual non-cooperative foundations.
7  Here is the basic structure of the
model in the form of a time line:
Date 0:  The firm forms a contract with a single worker selected from a population of workers. 
Their contract specifies a “non-restrictiveness” parameter p  [0, 1] that characterizes how likely
the worker would be able to serve a client of the firm if the worker separates from the firm and
becomes an entrepreneur.  The value p = 0 represents a very restrictive covenant, whereas p = 1
is a completely non-restrictive one.  Let p
0 denote the value of p that the worker and firm select.
Date 1:  A single client arrives and the firm and worker provide a standard service for this client,
which leads the worker to acquire knowledge for a specialized service opportunity.  A random
draw and location-specific parameters determine the worker’s cost of becoming an entrepreneur
(that is, starting his own firm), at which point he would be able to serve the client independently
from the existing firm.  Let k  [0, 1] denote the realization of the random draw and let  be its
distribution (c.d.f.).  The cost of becoming an entrepreneur is increasing in k, so k = 0 means that
the worker can easily become an entrepreneur (low cost) whereas k = 1 means that it would be
very difficult for the worker to do so.  The client, firm, and worker commonly observe k.
Date 2:  The client, firm, and worker together negotiate over whether the firm and worker will
stay together to provide the specialized service to the client and, if not, whether to renegotiate
the firm and worker’s initial contract in order to change p
0 to some new value p1.  The
disagreement point is separation of the worker from the firm (which the parties can each
unilaterally compel) and p1 = p
0.
87
given period of time when negotiation occurs.  An alternative specification, in which separation
occurs only if the parties actively choose it (some call this the outside option principle), leads to
a slightly different outcome of the bargaining at Date 2 but does not alter our general results. 
9It does not matter whether the initial contract between the firm and worker covers aspects of this
productive activity, given the renegotiation opportunity and disagreement point described above.
10Unverifiability is a particular problem in settings of cross (cooperative) investment and unified
investment and trade actions (Buzard and Watson 2010, building on Che and Hausch 1999), or
when trade involves “complexity/ambivalence” as described by Segal (1999), Hart and Moore
(1999), and Reiche (2006).  On costly contracting, see Dye (1985) and the literature that
followed, including Anderlini and Felli (1994), Battigalli and Maggi (2002), and Schwartz and
Date 3:  If the firm and worker stayed together at Date 2, then they work together to provide the
specialized service to the client.  If the firm and worker had separated at Date 2 then the worker
becomes an entrepreneur.  Then, after some set-up period, the entrepreneur and the client arrange
for the entrepreneur to provide the specialized service.  Further, the firm takes legal action
against the entrepreneur and, in the event that the entrepreneur is barred from providing the
specialized service, the firm provides some generic version of the specialized service for the
client.
Rather than model the details of the interaction and legal intervention at Date 3, we
simply describe the resulting payoffs.  We assume that if the firm and worker stay together to
provide the specialized service, then this work is contractible and it creates a surplus of 1 unit. 
This surplus can be verified and arbitrarily divided between the parties as specified by their
agreement at Date 2.
9
On the other hand, if the firm and worker separate then the joint payoff of the client, firm,
and worker is given by the function X(p, k).  The key assumption we make is that productive
interaction occurring after the worker separates from the firm is not contractible prior to the
separation.  There may be various reasons for this lack of contractibility, including problems
involving unverifiable investment and/or contracting costs.  Rather than include the details in the
model here, however, we refer to the conclusions of the well developed literature on specific
investment and contracting costs.
10  Thus, we assume that the parties’ continuation payoffs8
Watson (2004).
11The assumption of equal bargaining weights is not essential to the results but keeps the analysis
simple.
following separation are a function of p and k only, and the division of X cannot be determined
earlier.  Let xE(p, k), xC(p, k), and xF(p, k) denote the individual separation values for the
entrepreneur, client, and firm, respectively.  These are assumed to be twice continuously
differentiable.  We have
X(p, k) = xE(p, k) + xC(p, k) + xF(p, k).
Importantly, note that if at Date 2 the client, firm, and worker want to split the joint value of
separation in an arbitrary way, they would have to do so by agreeing to make lump-sum
monetary transfers either at Date 2 or in the future.
To summarize, the model has explicit strategic elements at Dates 0 and 2, where
negotiation takes place.  We shall analyze the negotiation at these dates using standard
bargaining theory.  We assume that the mass of workers is large compared to the mass of firms,
so the firm has all of the bargaining power at Date 0.  The worker’s outside option at Date 0 is
normalized to 0, and so negotiation at Date 0 is resolved by maximizing the firm’s payoff subject
to the worker obtaining at least 0.  We assume that negotiation at Date 2 is resolved according to
the standard Nash bargaining solution, which maximizes the product of each player’s payoff in
excess of his/her disagreement value.
11
We also incorporate a legal restriction on p by requiring that p  p , where p represents a
legal lower bound on the probability that the worker will be able to serve the client in the event
of separation.  If non-compete clauses are unenforceable in the given location, then p is close to9
one.  We shall later consider the implications of variations in p across jurisdictions.
We make the following basic assumptions.
Assumption 1:
(a) X(p, k), xE(p, k), and xC(p, k) are all strictly increasing in p and strictly decreasing in
k.  That is, as the worker and firm’s contract becomes less restrictive, the joint value of
separation increases.  Furthermore, as the cost of becoming an entrepreneur increases, the joint
value of separation declines.  Also, xF(p, k) is decreasing in p and increasing in k.  Thus, the
firm’s separation value rises with the restrictiveness of the covenant with the worker and with
the worker’s cost of becoming an entrepreneur, because this lowers the ability of the client and
entrepreneur to work together (forcing the client to sometimes work with the firm).
(b) X(1, 1) < 1, and X(1, 0) > 1.  In words, when the entrepreneur’s cost is maximal then
separation is inefficient, even under the least restrictive contract.  On the other hand, if the
contract does not restrict the entrepreneur at all and the start-up cost is minimal, then separation
is efficient.
Note that Assumption 1(b) implies that it is sometimes more efficient for the worker to
provide the customized service to the client as an entrepreneur (in a new firm of his own) rather
than in the context of his employer (the current firm).   There are many reasons for this.  The
worker may have developed a client-specific innovation that is disruptive of the firm’s way of
doing business (Tushman and Anderson 1986, Henderson and Clark 1990), or the firm’s project-
management system or staff may be poorly suited for the client’s needs.  The firm cannot
reconfigure itself to incorporate the innovation or change its personnel because that lowers the
value it creates with all its other clients.  The firm can start a free-standing unit to serve the
client, but it may operate at a higher cost than the worker’s own new firm, because of the need to
retain compatibility with the incumbent firm’s “headquarters services” (Ono 2003) —10
12In a previous version of this paper (Rauch and Watson 2005), we noted that the quality of the
effort or investment that an employee makes on behalf of the client may not be verifiable and
therefore not contractible, and that the value of the customized service itself may not be
verifiable.  Working on his own account, the employee has a greater incentive to exert effort and
provides a more valuable service.  However, the non-contractibility greatly complicates the
model without adding insight. 
13Similar problems arise in loan arrangements with the client and firm.  A loan from the client is
subject to hold-up, whereby, after the effort decision, the worker refuses to consummate trade
unless the loan is renegotiated.  This implies that the entrepreneur’s and client’s continuation
payoffs from the time that they contract are independent of the sunk loan amount, meaning that
the client is merely making an immediate transfer to the firm through the worker.  A loan from
the firm requires the same verification of returns as would a loan from a bank; the worker could
hide his returns from the firm and, anticipating that it cannot compel the worker to repay, the
firm will not issue the loan. 
14Workers we have interviewed do not consider borrowing to buy out their non-compete
contracts to be a viable option.  Several workers with a major international market research firm,
disgruntled with a change in management following a merger, told us they thought they could
better serve their clients by setting up their own firms but felt “trapped” by their non-competes
accounting and reporting, marketing, R&D, etc.
12
Our final assumption is that the worker is liquidity constrained, in particular at Date 2,
when the parties are negotiating over whether to stay together and/or to revise the firm-worker
contract.  In reality, there are several barriers that limit the ability of the worker to make a
monetary transfer to the firm.  First, workers generally do not have the resources to internally
(out of pocket) finance a large payment.  Second, external financing generally is limited due to
informational asymmetries between the worker and outside lending institutions.  If future returns
from the client are unverifiable, the entrepreneur/worker can hide his income and declare that his
new firm has failed.  Furthermore, if banks cannot easily distinguish between the workers in our
model and other, high-risk agents, then the banks will not be willing to lend the worker the
money required to buy out his non-compete agreement.
13  The liquidity-constraint assumption is
also consistent with the stories that workers tell.
1411
and “lacked the cash” to buy them out.
15The assumption of no liquidity at Date 0 simplifies the analysis of negotiation at Date 0 and
does not drive the basic results.  In the case of m large, for instance, if we assume that the
worker’s liquidity at Date 0 is also unconstrained, our results are unchanged.
Rather than adopt a single motivating story for the worker’s liquidity constraint, we
simply assume that there is an upper bound on the amount of money that the worker can transfer
to the other parties at Date 2 and, for simplicity, we suppose that the bound is zero at Date 0.
Assumption 2 [Liquidity Constraint]:  At Date 2 the worker can transfer at most m to the other
players, where m  0 is a fixed number.  Promises to transfer money later cannot be enforced.  At
Date 0, the worker can transfer nothing to the firm.
15
We can think of m as determined by the collateral against which the entrepreneur could borrow. 
For a professional and business service enterprise, there is little in the way of tangible assets to
seize, so m should be small.
The liquidity constraint comes into play only in the event of separation, because when the
parties stay together they form a contract that commits them to an arbitrary division of the
surplus of 1 that is generated at Date 3.  If at Date 2 the parties choose to revise the terms of the
firm-worker contract (picking p1gp
0) and separate, then their continuation values are xE(p, k),
xC(p, k), and xF(p, k), plus any transfers made at Date 2 (subject to the worker’s liquidity
constraint).
3.   Analysis and Results
We begin by characterizing the outcome of bargaining at Date 2, for a given p
0 selected
at Date 0 and k realized at Date 1.  We suppose that negotiation is resolved according to the Nash12
bargaining solution, where the parties have equal bargaining weights and the bargaining set
incorporates the worker’s liquidity constraint.  That is, the parties negotiate to achieve
continuation payoffs of (vW, vC,, vF) with the objective of solving:
max (vW – xE(p
0, k))(vC – xC(p
0, k))(vF – xF(p
0, k))
subject to: vW + vC + vF = 1 (stay together)  or vW + vC + vF = X(p1, k) (separate);
p1 is between 0 and 1; and
in the event of separation, vW  xE(p1, k) – m.
Because of the liquidity constraint, the bargaining set is not generally convex, but the Nash
solution still exists.  Let v* W(p
0, k), v* C(p
0, k), and v* F(p
0, k) be the values that solve this
maximization problem.  These are the continuation payoffs of the players from Date 2, given the
terms of the contract between the firm and worker and given the realization k.
Next we provide a simplified expression of the bargaining solution.  Because the client
and firm can freely make transfers to each other, the solution of the bargaining problem will
equate their surplus shares, meaning that
v* C(p
0, k) – xC(p
0, k) = v* F(p
0, k) – xF(p
0, k).
Thus, we can add the condition vC – xC(p
0, k) = vF – xF(p
0, k) to the maximization problem,
allowing us to express the bargaining problem as one with two parties: the worker and (as a unit)
the client and firm.  This problem is:
max (vW – xE(p
0, k))(1/4)(vC + vF – xC(p
0, k) – xF(p
0, k))
2
subject to: vC – xC(p
0, k) = vF – xF(p
0, k)
vW + vC + vF = 1 (stay together)  or vW + vC + vF = X(p1, k) (separate),
p1 is between 0 and 1, and
in the event of separation, vW  xE(p1, k) – m.
Note that it will not be optimal to choose p1 < p
0, so the third constraint is really p1  [p
0, 1].  The
components of the bargaining set are depicted in Figure 1.  In the figure, we simplify the13
16With p = 0, the client loses the difference between the quality of service provided by the
worker-turned-entrepreneur and that provided by the firm without the worker, whereas with p =
1 the firm loses all (expected) revenue from the client.
notation by defining xCF(p, k)  xC(p, k) + xF(p, k).  The figure illustrates the setting in which 
xC(p, k) + xF(p, k) is decreasing in p, which is an assumption we make for several results below. 
This assumption implies that the firm loses more than the client gains by weakening its control
over the worker in the event of separation.
16
The left panel of Figure 1 shows the ways of dividing the joint value of staying together
(the line of slope – 1) as well as the separation payoffs for different values of p and no additional
monetary transfers.  The right panel of Figure 1 depicts also the feasible payoffs when monetary
transfers are made.  Note that points (xE(1, k) – h, xCF(1, k) + h) are enforceable for all h  m
vC+ vF
vW
The frontier of the bargaining set is the
solid black line (upper envelope).  Possible
disagreement points (indicated by filled
circles) are given by ( ( ,  ),  ( ,  ))
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Figure 1: The bargaining set at Date 2, given p
0 and k.14
(including h < 0).  These represent continuation payoffs achieved if the parties set p1 = 1 and
where the worker transfers h to the other parties.  At h = m the worker’s liquidity constraint is
met.  For h > m, a payoff vector (xE(1, k) – h, xCF(1, k) + h) is physically possible, and hence
feasible in the economic environment, but it is not feasible in the bargaining problem because it
requires a promise for the worker to transfer money in the future (which is not enforceable). 
Points on the curve (xE(p, k) – m, xCF(p, k) + m) are feasible in the bargaining problem but they
are inefficient outcomes.  Points on the “stay together” line are also inefficient if X(1, k) > 1, as
is depicted in Figure 1.  The frontier of the bargaining set is given by the black line.
Figure 2 gives examples of disagreement points and their corresponding bargaining
outcomes (agreement points).  Note that, as shown in the right panel, if X(1, k) < 1 then the
parties stay together and realize an efficient outcome.  As the left panel makes clear, in some
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Figure 2: Illustration of the solution to negotiation at Date 2.15
cases the bargaining solution leads to an inefficient outcome, where the parties fail to set p1 = 1. 
In such cases, they would have been better off by setting p1 = 1 and having the entrepreneur
make a voluntary transfer to the other parties after he directly provides the specialized service to
the client (yielding an arbitrary point on the faint black line in the figure).  But a promise by the
worker to transfer money later is unenforceable, so the liquidity constraint here leads to the
inefficiency.  If the worker is not liquidity constrained (so m is sufficiently large), then Date 2
renegotiation always leads to the efficient outcome:
Result 1:  If m is sufficiently large then negotiation achieves the efficient outcome given k.  That
is, in the case of X(1, k) < 1, the parties stay together.  In the event of X(1, k) > 1, the parties
renegotiate to select p1 = 1, there are some lump-sum transfers, and the worker and firm separate.
Proof:  In this case, the frontier of the bargaining set is the set of all continuation payoff vectors
that sum to the maximum of X(1, k) and 1, so the result is obvious. b
More generally, the extent of inefficiency falls as the liquidity constraint is relaxed.
Result 2:  The set of pairs (p
0, k) under which separation occurs is increasing in m.  In other
words, if m1 > m and if separation would occur for a given (p
0, k) and m, then separation also
would occur in the case of (p
0, k) and m1.  Under the additional assumption that xE(p, k) – [xC(p,
k) + xF(p, k)] is increasing in p, then, conditional on separation, the renegotiated p1 is (weakly)
increasing in m.  Under the assumption that xC(p, k) + xF(p, k) is decreasing in p, if m = 0 then p
is not renegotiated, so p1 = p
0.
Proof:  The first part of this result is proved by noticing that increasing m relaxes the constraints
of the maximization problem that characterizes the solution to the negotiation at Date 2, and it
does so only for the separation choice.  On the claim about p1, one can easily show by comparing
Nash products that if p2 is selected with m1 whereas p1 is selected with m, then it must be that
xE(p2, k) – xCF(p2, k)  xE(p1, k) – xCF(p1, k).  The additional assumption in the statement of the
result then implies that p2p1.  On the final claim, if xC(p, k) + xF(p, k) is decreasing in p and if
m = 0, then the firm and client (jointly) strictly lose by raising p, so they will not allow p
0 to be
renegotiated upward.  Note, by the way, that the assumption of xC(p, k) + xF(p, k) decreasing in p
implies that xE(p, k) – [xC(p, k) + xF(p, k)] is increasing in p, given Assumption 1.  b16
Next we establish how the firm’s payoff from Date 2, v* F(p
0, k), depends on p
0.  Let k be
the unique value of k that satisfies X(1, k) = 1.  Assumption 1 guarantees that k is well defined.
Result 3:  Take any number J > 0.  There exists a number p ˆ < 1 such that v* F(p ˆ, k) > v* F(1, k) for
all k Õ (k – J, k).  Furthermore, if  xC(p, k) + xF(p, k) is decreasing in p, then v* F(p
0, k) is
everywhere strictly decreasing in p
0, for all k.
Proof:  To prove the first statement, consider any k  k.  In this case, the frontier of the
bargaining set is the unit simplex; it is efficient for the parties to stay together and so, regardless
of p
0, they will stay together and split the benefit of 1.  Lowering p
0 has the effect of strictly
decreasing X and increasing xF.  Thus, the firm’s disagreement point increases and the bargaining
surplus strictly increases, which implies that v* F strictly rises.
Next consider values k < k.  Think of the bargaining problem in the form with the client
and firm as one player.  We shall use the following lemma, which is obvious for cases of
transferrable utility but also easy to prove for general nonconvex bargaining sets:
Lemma 1: Consider any two-player bargaining set S that has a closed Pareto frontier but is not
necessarily convex.  Let the bargaining solution be the generalized Nash solution (which
maximizes the Nash product), with positive bargaining weights 1 and 2 for players 1 and 2. 
Take two different disagreement points d, d 1S such that d11d1 and d21d2.  Let b be the
bargaining outcome under disagreement point d, and let b1 be the bargaining outcome under
disagreement point d 1.  Then b11b1 and b21b2.  That is, each player’s payoff is increasing in
his own disagreement value and decreasing in the other player’s disagreement value.
For p
0 sufficiently close to 1, the disagreement point (xE(p
0, k), xCF(p
0, k)) lies above the
unit simplex (that is, xE(p
0, k) + xCF(p
0, k) > 1) and so all of the relevant points on the frontier of
the bargaining set involve separation.  By continuity of xE and xCF, for any given J > 0 we can
find a number p ˆ < 1 such that xE(p ˆ, k) + xCF(p ˆ, k) > 1 for every k < k – J.  It is not difficult to
verify that v* F(p ˆ, k) > v* F(1, k) for every k < k – J.  To see this, note that xE(p ˆ, k) < xE(1, k). If xCF(p ˆ,
k)  xCF(1, k) then clearly v* F(p ˆ, k) > v* F(1, k) because the disagreement point shifts in favor of the
client and firm jointly, so they fare better jointly (by the Lemma), and furthermore the firm’s
disagreement point rises whereas the client’s falls.
In fact, the result also holds if xCF(p ˆ, k) < xCF(1, k).  To see this, note that v* F(1, k) = xF(1,
k) and v* C(1, k) = xC(1, k).  Then observe that
v* F(p ˆ, k) + v* C(p ˆ, k)  xCF(p ˆ, k),
which, implies that
[v* F(1, k) + v* C(1, k)] – [v* F(p ˆ, k) + v* C(p ˆ, k)]  xCF(1, k) – xCF(p ˆ, k),
and so
[v* F(1, k) + v* C(1, k)] – xCF(1, k)  [v* F(p ˆ, k) + v* C(p ˆ, k)] – xCF(p ˆ, k).
That is, the surplus shared by the client and firm is smaller when p
0 = 1 that it is when p
0 = p ˆ. 
Using the fact that the client and firm equally divide this surplus and that xC(p ˆ, k) < xC(1, k) and
xF(p ˆ, k)  xF(1, k), we conclude that v* F(p ˆ, k) > v* F(1, k).17
Under the assumption that xC(p, k) + xF(p, k) is decreasing in p, we can apply the Lemma
above to establish that v* C(p
0, k) + v* F(p
0, k) is decreasing in p
0.  This conclusion also uses the
assumption that xE(p, k) is increasing in p.  That is, considering the client and firm as a single
player with twice the bargaining power of the worker, the disagreement point (xE(p
0, k), xCF(p
0,
k)) shifts in favor of the worker as p
0 increases, and thus (from the Lemma) v* C(p
0, k) + v* F(p
0, k)
decreases.
Note that, from the bargaining solution, the firm’s payoff can be written:
v* F(p
0, k) = xF(p
0, k) + (1/2)[v* C(p
0, k) + v* F(p
0, k) – xC(p
0, k) – xF(p
0, k)].
Combining terms, we get:
v* F(p
0, k) = (1/2)xF(p
0, k) – (1/2)xC(p
0, k) + (1/2)[v* C(p
0, k) + v* F(p
0, k)].
We have established that the third term on the right of this equation is decreasing in p
0.  The first
two terms also are decreasing in p
0 from Assumption 1 (the second term strictly so).  Therefore,
we have that v* F(p
0, k) is strictly decreasing in p
0. b
Next we can establish properties of the contract made between the firm and worker at
Date 0.   Let yW, yC, and yF denote the expected payoffs of the worker, client, and firm from the




0) = E[v* W(p
0, k) | ], yC(p
0) = E[v* C(p
0, k) | ], and yF(p
0) = E[v* F(p
0, k) | ].
Since the worker cannot make a monetary transfer to the firm at Date 0, and since the firm has
all of the bargaining power at this time, contract negotiation is resolved by the selection of p
0
that maximizes yF(p
0).  Because v* F(p
0, k) is decreasing in p
0 for all k (at least for p
0 close to 1 in
the general case, and for all p
0 with the added assumption on xC + xF), we know that yF(p
0) is also
decreasing.  This proves the following result.
Result 4:  At Date 0, in the initial contract between the firm and worker, the parties form a
restrictive covenant by setting p
0 < 1.  Under the assumption that xC(p, k) + xF(p, k) is decreasing
in p, the parties optimally set p
0 = p.  That is, they use the most restrictive covenant allowed by
law.  In general, as p rises, the chosen value of p
0 also (weakly) rises.
The next result, which follows from Results 2 and 4 above, describes the outcome in18
more detail for a particularly simple class of environments.
Corollary 1:  Suppose that xC(p, k) + xF(p, k) is decreasing in p, and m = 0.  Then the firm and
worker set p
0 = p and this restrictive covenant is never renegotiated.  At Date 2, the parties
separate if and only if X(p, k) > 1 for the realized k.  When they separate, it is done on inefficient
terms (since p1 = p
0).  For some values of k  (in particular, where X(p, k) < 1 < X(1, k)) the parties
stay together when it would be efficient to separate.
An implication of Corollary 1 is that a policy setting p = 1 eliminates the possibility that the
worker’s liquidity constraint will lead to an inefficient outcome.  It is perhaps surprising that, in
the presence of a distortion induced by a liquidity constraint, a second-best policy (non-
enforcement of non-competes) is able to fully restore the social optimum.  This result is
explained by the fact that the distortion only comes into play when it is efficient for the worker
and client to separate from the firm. 
The next issue to consider is how the client’s payoff depends on p
0.  Intuition suggests
that the client would fare better as p
0 increases, because (a) this may decrease the likelihood that
the worker fails to separate from the firm when it would be more efficient for the client and
entrepreneur to work together, and also (b) it increases the client’s disagreement payoff for
negotiation at Date 2.  The latter point interacts with the fact that the worker’s disagreement
payoff also increases as p
0 rises, and it is theoretically possible for the worker’s disagreement
payoff to increase much more than does the client’s, such that the resulting decrease in
bargaining surplus leads the client to be worse off.  Also, because the bargaining set is the not
convex, the intuition suggested above does not generally hold at the margin for all values of p
0.
However, we can establish that the client’s payoff from Date 0 unambiguously increases in p
0 for
some large classes of settings.19
Result 5:  Assume that 2xC(p, k) – xE(p, k) – xF(p, k) is increasing in p, meaning that for all k the
client’s separation payoff is increasing in p at least as much as is the average of the
entrepreneur’s and firm’s separation payoffs.  Assume also that xC(p, k) + xF(p, k) is decreasing
in p.  If m = 0 or if m is sufficiently large, then v* C(p
0, k) is increasing in p
0 for all k.  Furthermore,
yC(p
0) is increasing in p
0.
Proof:  Consider first a value of p
0 where the bargaining solution is at a point on the frontier
with slope – 1 (that is, either where the parties stay together and vW + vC + vF = 1 or where they
separate with p1 = 1).  Suppose p
0 is increased by a small amount.  By the first assumption in the
statement of the result, this change in p
0 has the effect of moving the disagreement point in a
direction that favors the client relative to the other two parties.  Because the total value that they
achieve does not change, we conclude that the client’s share increases.  Thus, v* C(p
0, k) rises.
In the case in which m is large, the liquidity constraint never binds and, regardless of k,
the bargaining solution is always at a point on the frontier with slope – 1.  This proves the result
for the case of m large.  In the case in which m = 0, the conclusion continues to hold for values of
k in which the parties stay together and so vW + vC + vF = 1.  For other values of k, at Date 2 the
parties will separate with p1 = p
0 because, under the assumption that xC(p, k) + xF(p, k) is
decreasing in p, the firm and client refuse to renegotiate.  In this case, we have
v* C(p
0, k) = xC(p
0, k),
and result follows from the fact that xC(p, k) is increasing in p. b
Remark on the liquidity-constrained case:  In Corollary 1 and Result 5, we singled out
the extreme case of constrained liquidity, where m = 0, because the analysis is particularly clean
in this case.  In fact, these results continue to hold with only minor modifications for values of m
that are close to zero.  To see this, note that the frontier of the bargaining set varies continuously
in m.  (As m increases, the point (xE(p
0, k) – m, xCF(p
0, k) + m) shifts in the direction (-1, 1).) 
Thus, for m close to zero, and except for a small set of k, the renegotiated point p1 is close to its
counterpart with m = 0.  The main technical issue is that this conclusion may not hold for all k,
due to non-convexity of the bargaining set, but the set of k values for which the conclusion does
not hold must be small as m converges to zero.  Also, we have to modify Corollary 1’s statement
that, with m = 0, p
0 is never renegotiated.  When m is close to zero, the parties will renegotiate
any p
0 < 1 but, for most k, p1 will be close to p
0.  With these notes in mind, when we speak of the20
17We conjecture that this logic would also apply to the choice of initial contract by the firm and
worker when the third party is another firm attempting to “poach” the worker rather than a client
the worker may serve as an entrepreneur.
18In an influential law review article favoring enforcement of restrictive covenants, Sterk (1993,
p. 406) argues that, “nothing prevents the employee from bargaining with his employer for
release from the covenant.  If either the employee himself or other prospective employers value
the employee’s services more than his current employer does, the employee should be willing to
liquidity constrained case hereinafter, we shall focus on m = 0.
In summarizing and discussing our results, it is useful to distinguish between those
results that hold regardless of whether workers are liquidity constrained and those that do not.  In
the following discussion we maintain the assumptions of Result 5, which are restated here:
Assumption 3:  For all k, xC(p, k) + xF(p, k) is decreasing in p and 2xC(p, k) – xE(p, k) – xF(p, k) is
increasing in p.
Whether or not the worker is liquidity constrained, in their initial contract the firm and
the worker agree to the most restrictive covenant the courts will enforce (p
0 = p, Result 4).  This
puts the firm and worker in a strong bargaining position with the client when the latter enters the
picture.
17  Not surprisingly, then, the payoff to the client increases as the covenant weakens
(v* C(p
0, k) is increasing in p
0, Result 5).  Combining these two results, we see that client payoffs
increase with p, which will be important in the next section of this paper when we consider the
allocation of clients across jurisdictions. 
When the worker is not liquidity constrained, the client, firm, and worker stay together or
the client and worker separate from the firm when it is efficient to do so (Result 1).  Moreover,
in the latter case the firm agrees to give up its right to pursue the worker in court to force him not
to serve the client.
18  Note that separation (entrepreneurship) is not affected by the initial contract21
pay the employer to release him from the contract.” 
between the firm and worker and therefore not affected by jurisdictional policy regarding
enforcement of non-competes.  We can interpret this result in terms of Coase (1960).  Think of
p  = 0 as assigning property rights in the client relationship to the firm and p = 1 as assigning
property rights in the client relationship to the worker.  It follows from Result 1 that the same,
efficient economic outcome is obtained regardless of this assignment of property rights. 
On the other hand, when the worker is liquidity constrained the firm and worker never
renegotiate their initial contract (Corollary 1):  the worker is unable to buy property rights in the
client relationship from the firm.  Consequently, unless p = 1, the parties sometimes stay together
when it would be efficient to separate.  There is an inefficiently low level of entrepreneurship. 
Moreover, when clients and workers do separate from firms, it is on inefficient terms:  there are
disputes that are handled by the courts.  Both forms of inefficiency decrease as the liquidity
constraint is relaxed (Result 2).
As p increases, jurisdictions increasingly neutralize the “stick” employers can use to
discourage their employees from taking away clients.  We can then expect employers to rely
more heavily on the “carrot” of bribing employees to stay with their firms.  We conclude the
discussion of our results with the following lemma, which confirms this intuition:
Lemma 2:  Regardless of the liquidity constraint, conditional on values of k for which the
parties elect to stay together at Date 2, the compensation paid to the worker is increasing in p
0 =
p.
Proof: Consider a value of k for which the parties decide to stay together at Date 2.  From the
bargaining solution, the worker obtains a payoff of xE(p
0, k) + (1/3)[1 – X(p
0, k)], which equals
(1/3)[2xE(p
0, k) – xC(p
0, k) – xF(p
0, k) + 1].  This expression is increasing in p
0, given Assumptions
1 and 3. b22
19Djankov et al. (2002) find that the monetary cost of satisfying government regulatory
requirements to establish a new business in the United States is less than one-half of one percent
of per capita GDP. 
20We assume away integer problems.
4. Choice of Jurisdictions by Clients
In this section we consider multiple locations indexed by i.  These locations can have
different policies pi regarding enforcement of non-competes, so we refer to them as jurisdictions. 
They can also vary by the distribution i of the cost of becoming an entrepreneur.  We think of
this variation as arising from differences in bureaucratic efficiency rather than differences in out-
of-pocket costs to entrepreneurs.
19  We maintain Assumption 3 throughout this section.
We assume that at the beginning of the period of interaction that we analyze, a fixed
measure (quantity) of clients Q is allocated over a fixed number n of jurisdictions.  Clients may
differ in terms of needs and preferences, but they do not differ in productivity.  Each client
inelastically demands one unit of commercial space.  Commercial rent in a given jurisdiction is
increasing in the quantity of clients Qi located there:
ri = r(Qi), r1 > 0.
The producer surplus associated with this upward-sloping supply curve is part of local income. 
After the clients have arrived, the N identical firms in each jurisdiction hire workers in
anticipation of serving clients.  To maintain the simplicity of the bargaining problem between
any firm and worker, we assume that each firm correctly anticipates serving qi  Qi
N clients
and interviews qi workers, without either firms or workers having a second chance to match.
2023
21Here we have simply applied Result 4.  In doing so, we have not allowed for the possibility that
firms might compete for clients by raising p
0 above pi.  Recall, however, that by Result 3 we
have v* F(p
0, k) everywhere strictly decreasing in p
0, for all k.  If the elasticity of the number of
firm clients with respect to p
0 is low, the firm is worse off for any p
0 > pi even though it attracts
more clients.  A low elasticity could be justified in a richer model in which services are
differentiated across firms and clients have heterogeneous preferences over services.
As before, the firm negotiates a contract with each worker that specifies p
0 = pi.
21  After
completing its hiring, each firm accepts qi clients.  Every client-firm-worker relationship then
unfolds as before.
Each client chooses the jurisdiction that maximizes her expected net income yCi – ri,
where yCi is the expectation of v* C(pi, k) taken over the distribution i of k.  In equilibrium,
therefore, it must be that
yCj – r(Qj) = yCi – r(Qi), j gi;   . QQ i
i
n
  ¦  
1
Using this equilibrium condition, we see that  yCi > yCj, implies Qi > Qj.  From Result 5, we also
see that if pi > pj, then yCi > yCj for a given .  This yields
Result 6:  Comparing jurisdictions that differ only in their enforcement of non-competes, the
number of clients will be higher where these agreements are less enforced (that is, where pi is
higher).
It follows that jurisdictions with higher pi will have greater employment in professional and
business services and greater total output of professional and business services.  The next result
implies that greater efficiency in processing business startups brings about the same outcome:
Result 7: Assume that 2xE(p, k) – xC(p, k) – xF(p, k) is decreasing in k.  Suppose that, for two24
otherwise identical  jurisdictions i and j, j favors higher values of k than does i, by first-order
stochastic dominance.  Then yCi  yCj.
Proof: To prove this result, it is sufficient to show that v* C(p
0, k) is decreasing in k.  This is
demonstrated using essentially the same steps described in the proof of Result 5, but considering
k instead of p
0. b
If workers are liquidity constrained, variation in pi leads to additional differences
between jurisdictions.  In particular, the following Corollary can be derived directly from
Corollary 1:
Corollary 2:  Suppose that m = 0.  Then the expected number of entrepreneurs per client and the
expected value of output per client increases with pi:
Since employment in professional and business services equals the number of clients, the
rate of client-based entrepreneurship (ratio of entrepreneurs to workers) in professional and
business services is higher in jurisdictions with weaker enforcement of non-competes.  Similarly,
productivity (output per worker) in professional and business services is also higher in these
jurisdictions.  Note that greater efficiency in processing business startups also produces these
differences across jurisdictions, whether or not workers are liquidity constrained. 
We conclude this section with the implications of our analysis for government policy. 
Denote the sum of expected payoffs to the three parties to a client-firm-worker relationship in
jurisdiction i by yi.  We have seen that the efficient level of yi (and the efficient rate of
entrepreneurship) is achieved for any pi if workers are not liquidity constrained, and for pi = 1
when workers are liquidity constrained.  We can now also consider the efficient allocation of
clients across jurisdictions.  Consider in particular the simple case where i is the same across
jurisdictions, so that the efficient level of yi is equal across jurisdictions.  It is then easily shown25
that, when this efficient level of yi prevails, total expected income from all client-firm-worker
relationships plus total producer surplus of all landlords that rent to clients is maximized when
clients are allocated equally across all jurisdictions (hence Qi = Q
n) .  This in turn only happens
when pi is equal across all jurisdictions:
Result 7:  Let i =  for all i.  The necessary and sufficient condition to maximize total expected
income from all client-firm-worker relationships plus total producer surplus of all landlords that
rent to clients is pj = pi,  for all j gi, when workers are not liquidity constrained, and pi = 1 for all
i when workers are liquidity constrained.
To achieve efficiency, policies regarding enforcement of non-competes must be
harmonized across jurisdictions even when workers are not liquidity constrained, because these
policies affect the location decisions of clients through their effects on the distribution of
expected payoffs from client-firm-worker relationships.  Clients do not internalize all of the
benefits of the decision to locate in a particular jurisdiction, because this includes benefits to
firms and workers who, in our model, do not contract with clients until location choices are
made.
5.   Discussion
Our conclusion that less enforcement of restrictive employment covenants positively
affects regional output is in partial agreement with Fallick, Fleishman, and Rebitzer (2003). 
They emphasize the positive impact on local high-tech industrial output of diffusion of ideas
through interfirm worker mobility, following Gilson (1999).  They are not concerned with
entrepreneurial activity or with endogenizing the choice of restrictiveness of employment
contracts by employers and workers, and do not see their mechanism as relevant for26
22Lewis and Yao use the term “openness” to refer to the ability of engineers to freely
communicate with peers in other firms, as they participate in research and development.  In
Lewis and Yao’s model, engineers value openness because it allows them to identify profitable
opportunities to put their knowledge to work in other firms.  Firms dislike openness because it
implies higher worker turnover and discontinued projects internally.  Lewis and Yao argue that,
although openness is efficient, it is actively reduced by firms as a way of compensating the firms
when engineers cannot make up front transfers due to liquidity constraints.  Firms offer more
open environments when engineers have a great deal of bargaining power.  
determination of regional output outside of high-tech industry.  
Franco and Mitchell (2008) consider enforcement of non-compete agreements in an
environment in which a firm and worker contract under asymmetric information without
liquidity constraints.  In contrast to our results, there is too much separation when non-competes
cannot be enforced, reflecting the inefficiency that typifies bargaining subject to asymmetric
information, whereas when non-competes can be enforced the efficient outcome is always
achieved.  The key to the latter result is that enforcement of non-competes is perfect (p = 0 in our
model) so that workers have identical outside options (zero) regardless of the realization of their
private information.  If enforcement of non-competes was incomplete or less than perfectly
certain then efficiency would not obtain because the different realizations are no longer
equivalent.
The kind of liquidity constraint that we posit is present in the work of Lewis and Yao
(2001), who look at restrictions on the “openness” of a workplace as a substitute for monetary
transfers from a worker to a firm.
22  Lewis and Yao focus on the working environment within a
firm and how the liquidity constraint causes a distortion in the initial contracting between
workers and firms.  In contrast, we analyze contractual restrictions that bind entrepreneurial
activity by workers after they have departed from firms, and we analyze the renegotiation of27
23Note that, if the firm’s investment decision is verifiable, then it can be directly specified in the
parties’ contract and enforced.  Renegotiation between the firm and the client over this
investment will ensure financing from the client when the parties choose to separate.  This
incentive for investment in workers is analogous to that given to firms by monopsony power
over workers in the model of Acemoglu and Pischke (1998).
24Posner, Triantis, and Triantis (2003) examine a model of employment in which the firm makes
a general-human-capital investment in the worker.  They study a class of contractual forms for
which there is a tension between (a) the firm and worker’s incentive to expropriate value from
outside firms that may employ the worker in the future, and (b) the firm’s incentive to invest. 
They show that the firm and worker may optimally pick a contract that leads to inefficient
investment.  However, it is not clear whether the tension between (a) and (b), and their results,
would disappear if all feasible contracts were considered.
restrictive covenants by workers, firms, and clients.  We demonstrate how the worker’s liquidity
constraint distorts the outcome of renegotiation.
The insights we provide go beyond those associated with the problem of firms making
investments in general human capital (Becker 1964; Mincer 1974).  In the familiar story, a
restrictive covenant may enhance the firm’s incentive to make a general-human-capital
investment in a worker, because otherwise part of the return of its investment will accrue to other
firms to which the worker may be joined in the future.  One concludes that courts should enforce
restrictive covenants unless they distort the socially-desirable interaction between the worker and
outside firms.  We contribute by analyzing such a distortion, namely frictions (caused by the
worker’s liquidity constraint) that constrict the parties’ ability to renegotiate effectively.  Our
analysis shows that this distortion has economic significance even without an investment
decision of the firm, because of the firm and worker’s interest in arranging their contract to
extract value from their subsequent clients.
23  Distortions may also arise in some settings if the
worker and firm cannot write sophisticated contracts that effectively manage the renegotiation
process to align ex ante incentives.
2428
In contrast to the general-human-capital story, Kräkel and Sliwka (2009) argue that it
benefits the firm not to impose a non-compete agreement on its employee because the latter then
has better incentives to innovate, or more generally to make investments of his own (see also
Baccara and Razin 2009 and Garmaise 2009).  Thus one cannot presume that the addition of an
investment or effort decision to our model would change our conclusions regarding the merits of
enforcing non-compete covenants in any particular direction.  In our model, the worker’s
innovation is a byproduct of his interaction with the client, and the firm can neither encourage
nor discourage the worker’s innovative activity short of preventing him from serving the client. 
We feel that this is, to a first approximation, an accurate depiction of the situation that exists in
most professional and business service activities.
Our sanguine conclusions regarding lack of enforcement of non-competes are perhaps
more open to challenge with respect to the impact on regional competitive advantage.  By taking
the number of firms in each jurisdiction as given, we abstract from any potential negative impact
resulting from the fact that the expected payoffs to firms are decreasing in pi.  Glaeser et al.
(2009) find that metro area employment growth is strongly predicted by smaller average
establishment size, and in our model establishment size (clients/workers per firm) would rise if
higher pi drove firms away.  In the presence of worker liquidity constraints, however, higher pi
increases the rate of entrepreneurship and therefore reduces establishment size.  The conclusion
of Glaeser et al. (2009) that variation in local costs of becoming entrepreneurs is more important
than variation in local returns to becoming entrepreneurs in determining establishment size
suggests that the latter effect might be stronger, but they do not directly examine regional
variation in enforcement of non-competes.  Clearly there is a need for additional empirical work29
in this area.
6.   Conclusions
We analyzed a model of professional and business service provision in which clients can
choose between locations that differ in enforcement of restrictive employment covenants
between firms and workers and in the efficiency with which they process business startups.  In
this context we focused on the relationship between one firm, one worker, and one client.  The
worker would like to wrest the value of the client relationship from his employer by setting up
his own firm.  If when an employer and worker establish a relationship they cannot contract on
the output and profits of the worker’s prospective new firm, the employer counters by inducing
the worker to sign a contract that prohibits him from competing or soliciting the current client in
the event of termination of employment.  The socially optimal level of entrepreneurship will
nevertheless be achieved if clients, employers, and workers can renegotiate these restrictive
employment contracts and make compensating transfers.  If workers cannot finance transfers to
employers, however, employers and workers will sign contracts that are too restrictive and
produce too little entrepreneurship, and governments can increase welfare by limiting
enforcement of these contracts.
Many of our results turn out to be robust to whether or not workers are liquidity-
constrained.  First, firms and workers will agree to make non-compete or non-solicitation
covenants as strict as they can.  Second, weaker enforcement of these covenants leads firms to
pay workers more when the parties stay together.  Third, weaker enforcement also attracts clients
to locations, generating greater employment and output in their professional and business service30
sectors.  Fourth, locations that more efficiently process business startups not only attract more
clients but also have higher rates of entrepreneurship and higher productivity in professional and
business services. 
There are, however, two important differences between our results with and without
liquidity constraints.  Without liquidity constraints, the decision by a worker and a client to
separate from a firm was always accompanied by renegotiation of the worker’s contract to assign
property rights in the client to him, whereas when the worker is liquidity-constrained
renegotiation often fails, leading to (i) the parties staying together when separation would have
been efficient, or (ii) the firm taking the worker to court to try to stop him from serving the client
as an entrepreneur.  The failure of renegotiation leads to the second important difference, which
is that by limiting enforcement of restrictive employment covenants, local governments can
generate more entrepreneurship and increase the total value generated by each client-firm-
worker relationship. 
A broader aim of this paper is to integrate the value created by client relationships into
economists’ thinking regarding determination of income and social welfare.  This will only
become more important as the service share of GDP continues to grow.  Because of conflicting
claims to the value created by client relationships that may interact with market failures, (1) the
market outcome may not be optimal; (2) the government cannot avoid intervention through the
legal system (because of its role in resolving disputes); therefore (3) we need to seek guidelines
for that intervention.31
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